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DOES THE FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT REMOVE
THE "LEPER'S BELL" FROM REHABILITATED
OFFENDERS?
RICHARD

S.

HARNSBERGER*

There is nothing more tragic in life than the utter impossibility of
changing what you have done.**

I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA),I passed in 1950, is a
comprehensive sentencing statute designed to provide treatment
and rehabilitation for persons between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-two who are convicted in federal courts. Sentencing under
the FYCA is automatic unless the court makes an express finding

on the record that the youth would receive no benefit from its
unique treatment features. 2 At the discretion of the judge, relief also
is available to adult offenders under twenty-six years old if an affirmative finding is made that youth treatment would be beneficial.3
Under section 5021 of the FYCA, if a youth offender is unconditionally released from commitment or unconditionally discharged
from probation before expiration of the maximum sentence initially
imposed, his conviction is "automatically set aside" and he is given
a certificate to that effect.' In Dorszynski v. United States, Chief
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. B.S. 1943, J.D. 1949, M.A. 1951, University of
Nebraska; S.J.D. 1959, University of Wisconsin.
** JOHN GALSWORTHY, JUsTIcE: A TRAGEDY iN FoUR AcTS, Act 11 (1910).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
2. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 444 (1974).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 4216 (1976). See also United States v. Torun, 537 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Hopkins, 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
4. In its entirety, section 5021 reads:
Certificate setting aside conviction. - (a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the
Commission of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum
sentence imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the
Commission shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court
may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender
from probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction.
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Justice Burger said that a "powerful tool" available under the
FYCA is the "discretion to discharge committed persons unconditionally before [being] required to do so, for upon such discharge
the conviction upon which the sentence rested would be automatically set aside." 5 This constitutes one of "the new options of treatment and probation made available to the federal sentencing court
under the Act."'
The United States Parole Commission issues approximately 650
certificates each year setting aside convictions;' the federal courts
probably issue substantially more, but exact figures are unavailable.' Of the large number of young persons who have received certificates since 1950, most believed they could begin life anew without
the crippling taint of a criminal record. Many later learned, however, that reliance on the value of their certificates was misplaced,
because the FBI does not erase a youth offender's record after receiving notice of his early discharge from the probation or parole
officer; instead, following the conviction notation on the criminal
"rap sheet," the Bureau simply adds the words "set aside."'
Under the federal regulations, there are no limits on distribution
of a young person's conviction data' 0 - they are available to prospective employers, licensing boards, educational institutions, and
others by means of the FBI's vast, nationwide computer network.
The resulting social and economic consequences to those whose convictions have been "set aside" are far-reaching and devastating.
The impact is especially harsh in the areas of employment and
professional licensing." In 1971, former Attorney General John
and the court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
Paragraph (b) was added in 1961. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-336, 75 Stat. 750 (1961).
5. 418 U.S. 424, 435 (1974).
6. Id.
7. Letter from Peter B. Hoffman, Director of Research, United States Parole Comm'n, to
Sandra D. Hockley (Oct. 6, 1978).
8. Letter from Barbara Meierhoefer, United States Parole Comm'n, to Richard S. Harnsberger (Mar. 13, 1979).
9. This policy was based on the views of the United States Board of Parole and established
after conferences between the Board and the FBI. Letter from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senator Roman L. Hruska (May 6, 1976).
10. See Criminal Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b) (1978). Even when
the dissemination was more restricted it was written that "most large companies have methods of indirect access to the files of the Criminal Identification and Investigation Bureau and
FBI." Note, The Effect of Expungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 127,
140 (1967).
11. Also affected by such distribution are voting rights, the right to hold public office, the
capacity to serve on a jury or as a court-appointed fiduciary, credibility as a witness, parental
rights, the acquisition of automobile insurance, and insurance pension and worker's compensation benefits. The severe penalties and disabilities resulting from a criminal record have
been well documented. See generally A. NE, DossiER - THE SE cREr FaEs THEY Kmw ON
You chs. 9, 10 (1975); A. Nussmum, A SECOND CHANCE - AMNESTY FOR THE FIRST OFFENDER
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Mitchell told a National Conference on Corrections that there is "an
appalling resistance to hiring ex-offenders, even by many government agencies at different levels . .

. When the releasee is thus

denied the means of making an honest living, every sentence becomes a life sentence."' 2 In 1975, while discussing how computer
systems make a "record prison" which places a "leper's bell" on exoffenders, Aryeh Neier said:
[A]rrest and conviction records often create social lepers who
must exist as best they can on the fringes of society.
The dissemination of records places a series of obstacles in the
path of persons who wish to enter society's mainstream and end
the half-life of the world of crimes. Is it any wonder, then, that
recidivism rates should be so high? How can we seriously hope to
reduce crime if we disseminate records which have the unintended3
effect of making it impossible for people to stop being criminals?
While the FBI interpretation of section 5021 was permanently stigmatizing youth offenders, the federal judges who decided the first
FYCA cases stressed the Act's rehabilitative aspects. These judges
recognized the cruelty of extrajudicial punishment after the young
person had faithfully fulfilled the conditions of probation or had
reacted to imprisonment in such a positive way that s/he was released before expiration of the maximum sentence imposed.
II.

THE EARLIER DECISIONS: SECTION

5021 AS A REHABILITATIVE LAW

Tatum v. United States" was the first case to consider the effect
of section 5021. In a per curiam opinion (with now Chief Justice
Burger participating), the D.C. Circuit considered a situation in
which the sentencing judge had vacated Tatum's original nine-year
sentence under the FYCA and imposed a new sentence of thirty-four,
to one hundred and two months (nearly three years to eight and a
(1974); Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders:
A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 150-62; Haskel, The Arrest Record and New

York City Public Hiring: An Evaluation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 442, 445-48 (1973);
Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 2 NAT'L PROB. & PAWoLE ASS'N J.
43 (1956); Schiavo, Comdemned by the Record, 55 A.B.A.J. 540 (1969); Comment,
Employment of "Criminal-Record-Victims"in Missouri: Restrictions and Remedies, 41 Mo.
L. REV. 349 (1976); Special Project, The CollateralConsequences of a Criminal Conviction,
23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).
12. See A. NFAxR, supra note 11, at 117.
13. CriminalJustice Information and Protection and Privacy Act of 1975: Hearingson S.
2008 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1975) (statement by A. Neier, the Executive Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union).
14. 310 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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half years) under the District of Columbia indeterminate sentence
law. Tatum objected on the ground that the second sentence was
more severe than the first and therefore illegal. The court agreed,
because Tatum's prospect of having his conviction automatically
set aside under the FYCA was such a marked and important difference from the ordinary, substituted sentence that it outweighed the
possibility of longer imprisonment under the FYCA sentence. The
court pointed out that a person sentenced under the FYCA "can,
by virtue of his own good conduct, be spared the lifelong burden of
a criminal record [so that the matter becomes] a non-criminal
episode so far as the public records are concerned."' 5 The court
concluded by saying that the FYCA acted "to expunge the conviction and the record . . . .
Mestre Morera v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Service 7 and United States v. Glasgow8 are representative of many
other decisions expressing the same viewpoint.' In the former case,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service claimed the authority
to deport Mestre Morera for a marijuana conviction which had been
set aside pursuant to section 5021. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the clear purpose of the FYCA was to relieve a youth
"not only of the usual disabilities of a criminal conviction, but also
to give him a second chance free of a record tainted by such a
conviction. ' 2 Both the act and the legislative history were found to
express congressional concern that juvenile offenders be afforded an
opportunity to atone for youthful indiscretions. The court noted
that although neither an executive pardon nor a judicial recommen15. Id. at 856.
16. Id. n.2.
17. 462 F.2d 1030 (lst Cir. 1972).
18. 389 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1975).
19. See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, No. 77-2011, 48 U.S.L.W. 2103 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1979)
(drug conviction record expunged, but placed in separate storage facility for use in criminal
investigations) (decided after this article was substantially through the editorial process);
United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1977) (conviction set aside under § 5021
is not a conviction for purposes of firearms law); United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162, 1163
(2d Cir. 1976) ("One of Judge Frankel's reasons for sentencing Cruz under the Act was that
§ 5021 of the Act permits expungement of his conviction."); United States v. Roberts, 515
F.2d 642, 644, 646 (2d Cir. 1975) (one of the advantages of the FYCA is the "opportunity to
have the conviction erased from his record"; a "chance to have the conviction expunged from
his record."); United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779, 782 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("This promise
of expungement [under section 5021] is an important one."); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d
334, 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973) (section 5021 "operates automatically
to vacate the conviction and clear the youth's criminal record."); United States v. Bronson,
449 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994 (1972); United States v. Borawski,
297 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Caviness, 239 F. Supp. 545, 553 (D.D.C.
1965).
20. 462 F.2d at 1032.
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dation of leniency could prevent deportation for a narcotics conviction, setting aside a conviction under the FYCA had a greater effect.
"Pardon and leniency at most restore to an offender his civil rights;
neither is as clearly directed as the Youth Correction Act toward
giving him a second chance, free of all taint of a conviction."',
In Glasgow, the defendant mailed some hashish from India to a
friend and former college classmate in the United States. After
being placed on probation, he petitioned the court to be resentenced
under the FYCA so he could be eligible to have his conviction set
aside under section 5021. The court granted the request after carefully reviewing the history of the FYCA. Great weight was placed
on the rehabilitative aspects which Congress had expressed so
clearly; setting aside convictions was regarded as a form of treatment having "a curative effect which facilitates the accomplishment of the correction of the antisocial tendencies of young offend'22
ers, and thus furthers the central goal of rehabilitation.
The Glasgow court viewed the permanency of a criminal record
as being especially harsh on young persons and said it was aware of
the literally thousands of discriminatory laws at all levels of government which handicapped those persons who were attempting to
secure employment and live useful and productive lives. Thus, setting aside a conviction under the FYCA enabled a young offender
to "begin anew," and, the court said, there was no reason for a judge
or Assistant United States Attorney to darken an individual's
"otherewise [sic] bright future by denying him the opportunity to
begin his mature adult life with a record clean of his felony conviction." The Glasgow opinion also took cognizance of a "growing
recognition that expungement provisions are essential to the fair
administration of justice and to the rehabilitation of offenders. ' 2
III.

A DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHY: THE McMains LINE OF CASES,
HOLDING THAT SECTION 5021 Is NOT AN EXPUNCTION STATUTE
A.

Fite v. Retail Credit Co.

Beginning in 1975, some federal judges began to adopt a different
philosophy by rejecting the view that section 5021 authorizes expunction of a young person's records. Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 5 a
federal district court case, is the first of these decisions. It is important because of its influence on the Eighth Circuit one year later,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
389 F. Supp. at 224.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 225 n.21.
386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976).
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when the Court of Appeals considered whether the FYCA authorizes
expunction of the record of conviction as well as the conviction
itself. In Fite, a young person pleaded guilty to theft of government
property. After successfully serving his probation and receiving a
certificate setting aside his conviction, he obtained summer employment between terms in college as an insurance salesman in Great
Falls, Montana.2 A week later the insurance company's home office
learned of both his conviction and its expunction through a routine
credit check. Fite was fired immediately. Thereafter, he commenced
proceedings seeking both a declaration that his record of arrest and
conviction was "exonerated" and an injunction to prohibit the
credit company from maintaining and distributing records of these
facts about him. The district court granted the defendant credit
company's motion for summary judgment. Its rationale was twofold. First, "[c]ourt proceedings are public events and the public
has a legitimate interest in knowing the facts in them."27 Second,
the judge said, two previous cases decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg" and
Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,-"
"indicate that in the Ninth Circuit a conviction under the Youth
Corrections Act does not disappear when a certificate of discharge
is issued.

' 30

Neither case, however, is close to being on point.

Hernandez-Valensuela held that an alien sentenced under the
FYCA could be deported even though there was a possibility that
he might ultimately receive a certificate setting aside his conviction.
The case did not deal with a conviction affected by section 5021.
Neither did Garcia-Gonzalesinvolve the FYCA. The only question
was whether an alien's conviction upon which a deportation order
rested had been "wiped out" under the provisions of a California law
authorizing such a procedure after a person successfully completes
the term of his probation. After considering the interplay of federal
and state laws, the court held that Congress intended to deport
aliens who violated the narcotics laws and that the State of California had no power to release a person from the penalties imposed by
federal law even though Congress could give the state's action that
effect if it so chose.
26. Letter from Chris J. Nelson, attorney for Mr. Fite, to Richard S. Harnsberger (June
15, 1976) (containing additional facts not found in the opinion).
27. 386 F. Supp. at 1046.
28. 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
29. 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
30. 386 F. Supp. at 1047.
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B.

United States v. McMains

From the viewpoint of young persons who have received, or who
hope to receive, a certificate setting aside their convictions, the most
Draconian and demoralizing decision has been United States v.
McMains.1' The case will be analyzed in detail because its rationale
is at cross purposes with the rehabilitative and humanitarian ideas
Congress had in mind. Duane Thomas McMains was charged on
September 27, 1971, with concealing and failing to report the robbery of a federally insured bank. On the same day he entered a
guilty plea; on November 30 he was sentenced to three years probation under the FYCA. On January 14, 1974, well before the end of
the probation period, he was discharged and received his certificate
under section 5021 informing him that his conviction had been set
aside. His records, however, stayed open, so he wrote the sentencing
judge during August 1975 and requested that the conviction record
be expunged. The U.S. District Court granted the request and ordered all records relating to the arrest and conviction to be expunged.32 The court found that the policy objectives of the FYCA
"militate in favor of such relief [and that] implicit in the Court's
power to expunge a youth offender's conviction is the power, in
appropriate instances, to expunge the record of conviction.

'33

The

Government appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
Originally the case was to be presented by briefs and arguments,
but later counsel were advised it was to be submitted on briefs
alone.3 Had there been a thirty-minute (or everi an abbreviated
twenty-minute) argument by each side, the court might not have
disregarded so much of the legislative history .which was vital for a
meticulous and appropriate disposition. The opinion was written by
Judge Ross and joined in by Judge Stephenson. Judge Heaney dissented.
Judges Ross and Stephenson, the majority in McMains, gave four
reasons for their unwillingness to regard section 5021 as an expunction statute. First, they deemed the legislative history to be inconclusive. Second, section 5021 did not specifically provide for record3 5
expunction, but a law passed by Congress twenty years later did.
Third, issuance to the youth offender of a certificate setting aside
the conviction would militate against an interpretation favoring
31. 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976).
32. Brief of Appellee at 2, United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Letter from Patrick J. Life, attorney on appeal for Mr. McMains, to Richard S.
Harnsberger (Feb. 19, 1979).
35. Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 404(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1236 (current version
at 21 U.S.C. § 844 (b)(2) (1976)),
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expunction, because if complete and absolute relief had been intended by Congress, a certificate would be unnecessary. Finally, it
would be incongruous to infer a right to expunge the record of a
conviction when there is in most cases no statutory right to expunge
the record of an arrest that does not result in a conviction. The
following analysis shows that none of these reasons is tenable.36
1.

The Legislative History

In 1941 a committee of the Judicial Conference of the Senior
Circuit Judges began studying punishment. Chief Judge John J.
Parker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
was chairman. Six other judges served; among them were Chief
Judge Bolitha J. Laws of the District of Columbia and Chief Judge
Orie L. Phillips of Denver who headed the subcommittee which gave
'special consideration to youth offenders and submitted a proposed
bill which provided:
Sec. 13. Upon the unconditional discharge by the Authority
[Youth Authority Division] of a youth offender before the expiration of six years from the date of his conviction, where an original
sentence was not imposed on such youth offender, and upon the
unconditional discharge by the Authority of a youth offender, upon
36. The McMains court also attempted to buttress its opinion by writing that commentators who have addressed the question of expunction under § 5021 are in disagreement. 540
F.2d at 388. For the proposition that the section is not an expungement law, it cited Gough,
The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of
Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147. Gough, after stating that the FYCA was similar to statutes
in nine states, wrote:
The effects of such statutes are not entirely clear, and they have been subjected to
interpretations quite at variance with the post-conviction relief they purport to
provide. Though the scope of alleviation provided by them is said to be broader
than that provided by pardon, they are clearly not statutes of expungement ....
Id. at 152 (footnotes omitted). Gough cited three decisions, Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965);
Hernandez-Valensuelao v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); and Tatum v. United
States, 310 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Id. at nn.32, 33. The first two are not on point. See
text accompanying notes 28-30 supra. After citing Tatum, there is a "But see" signal to a
New Jersey Attorney General's opinion which indicates that Gough is not resting his conclusion about § 5021 on the legislative history of the FYCA. In fact, he made no references
whatsoever to the history. Gough's statement, therefore, must be classified as a parenthetical
one within the text of a lengthy exposition on state statutes. It only states the obvious to
remark that interpretations given state laws which contain, in Gough's words, "essentially
similar provisions [as the FYCAI applicable to youth offenders," id. at 152, are irrelevant
when construing § 5021.
For commentaries concluding that the McMains type reasoning regarding section 5021 is
incorrect, see Saperstein, Expungement for Youth Offenders, 83 (no. 1) CASE & COMMENT 3
(1978); Schaefer, The Federal Youth CorrectionsAct: The Purposesand Uses of Vacating the
Conviction, 39 (no. 3) FED. PRoBATIoN 31 (1975); Comment, Expungement of Criminal Records Under the Federal Youth CorrectionsAct, 62 IowA L. Rv. 547 (1976).
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whom an original sentence was imposed, before the expiration of
the original sentence, the conviction shall be automatically set
aside and held for naught, and the Authority shall issue to the
youth offender a certificate to that effect.37

This section formed the basis of what is now section 5021 of the
FYCA.
The report of the entire committee was made to the Judicial
Conference in 194238 and at congressional hearings the next year."
Enactment of the proposed bill was delayed, however, because of
objections to the "indeterminate" sentencing provisions. This postponement gave the sponsors several opportunities to reaffirm their
recommendations dealing with youthful offenders, and they did so.4"
Finally, new hearings on the proposed FYCA commenced in 1949.
For the purpose of examining the rationale of McMains and similar
decisions, the matter vital to ascertain is whether Congress intended
expunction of youth offenders' records under section 5021. Yet, curiously, neither McMains nor its progeny analyzes the complete
legislative history pertaining to the section. To illustrate how much
persuasive testimony is left out of McMains, all the salient materials from the hearings which do appear in the opinion are capitalized
in the following discussion.
37.

COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT

JUDGES, PROPOSED DRAFT OF AN
ADULT AND YOUTH OFFENDERS §
38.

ACT RECOMMENDED
13, at 20 (1942).

TO PROVIDE A CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM FOR

COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT

JUDGES, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME (1942).
39. Federal Corrections Act and Improvement in Parole: Hearings on H.R. 2140 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943).
40. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 18-19 (1946). Section 13 appeared as follows in the 1946 Report: "In the event an offender is unconditionally
discharged before six years from date of his conviction, the conviction is automatically set
aside and the offender shall be issued a certificate to this effect by the Authority, such
certificate having the same effect as a pardon." Id. at 19. There is nothing to suggest why
the "held for naught" wording was deleted or why the reference to a pardon was included. In
any event, before final passage of the FYCA the pardon reference was left out because it might
have been an unconstitutional interference with the power of the President to pardon. See
Schaefer, supra note 36, at 32. As finally passed § 5021 was intended to, and does, provide
more extensive relief than an executive pardon. Id. A pardon "never erases the basic fact of
conviction. Neither does it remove the social stigma attaching to a criminal conviction. It
involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness." Stanish, The Effect of a PresidentialPardon,42 (no.
3) FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See also Buchanan, The Natureof a Pardon
Under the United States Constitution, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 36 (1978); Cozart, The Benefits of
Executive Clemency, 32 (no. 2) FED. PROBATION 33, 34 (1968); Schaefer, The Use of Expunged
Convictions in Federal Courts, 35 FED. B.J. 107, 115 (1976); Note, The Impact of Expungement Relief on Deportation of Aliens for Narcotics Convictions, 65 GEo. L.J. 1325, 1338
(1977).
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The 1949 Hearings

Several weeks before the senate hearings began on September 13,
1949, Senator Kilgore, the chairman of the Judiciary's subcommittee in charge of the bill, sent letters to the federal district judges to
obtain their views on the proposed legislation.4 ' Fifty-one replied. 2
Judge John Paul of Virginia wrote a lengthy letter stating that he
saw no reason for passage of the legislation, and he commented on
particular sections. He was especially critical of the theory that "no
record of an offense against the law should be held against" a person
between seventeen and twenty-four years of age, and he also objected to the concept of the sentence being "wiped out" and thus
unavailable in case of future offenses.43 Judge Wyche of Virginia
wrote Senator Kilgore a thoughtful reply which supported the proposed bill; it included the following paragraph:
Another feature of this act which appeals to me is the provision
that a sentence shall be automatically set aside and held for
naught upon the unconditional discharge of the youth offender,
and that the authority shall issue to the youngster a certificate to
that effect. I believe that a boy who makes one mistake should be
permanently forgiven that mistake if his subsequent conduct indicates that he has changed his behavior. One blot on his record may
cause him great harm when he applies for a position in later
years."

Clearly the two judges who addressed the matter of expunction in
responding to Senator Kilgore's letter believed the young person's
record would be wiped out completely.
A number of witnesses appeared to testify personally before the
subcommittee, including Judges Laws, Parker, and Phillips; the
Supreme Court has stated that because these judges were sponsors
of the FYCA, their views should be considered of "particular importance." 5 Judge Laws, who had served on the Senior Circuit
Judges Special Committee Studying General Punishment for Crime
and was a drafter of the original proposed FYCA, was the initial
41. Although the letters were addressed to Senator Pat McCarran, chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Kilgore's statement that "[wie circularized all of the
district judges" shows that he and his subcommittee actually sent the letters to the district
court judges. Correctional System for Youth Offenders: Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. at 43 (1949)

[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
42.
43.

Hearings, supra note 41, at 89-117.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 117.

44.
45. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974).
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witness. He testified: "COMMITTED YOUTH OFFENDERS
WHO EARN THEIR FINAL DISCHARGE BEFORE THE END
OF THEIR MAXIMUM TERM HAVE THEIR RECORDS
CLEARED AND ALL THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORED." 4 '
Later, he stated: "WHEN THE DIVISION TURNS THEM OUT
AHEAD OF THEIR MAXIMUM SENTENCE, THIS BLOTS
OUT THEIR SENTENCE AND LETS THEM GO WITHOUT
ANY STIGMA ON THEIR LIFE." 47
On the second day, Chief Judge Parker, the Chairman of the
Judicial Conference special committee which drafted the bill, appeared. After the judge and Senator Kilgore discussed particular
aspects of the proposed legislation, the senator described an experiment in the armed services which included review of court martials
by appointed civilian judges who could erase the record of the court
martial and substitute an honorable discharge for a dishonorable
discharge after a specified period of satisfactory service. The senator
said, "My understanding is that that has been remarkably successful in returning boys to life with no stain on their records and
thereby giving them a chance to straighten out." 48 Judge Parker
responded:
I AM GLAD YOU MENTIONED THAT BECAUSE THERE IS
ONE FEATURE IN THIS BILL WHICH IS VERY SALUTARY
AND THAT*IS THAT IF THE YOUTH OFFENDER IS RECLAIMED IN THE OPINION OF THE BOARD AND THEY
DECIDE TO RELEASE HIM, THEY CAN STRIKE OUT THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON HIM AND COMPLETELY SET
ASIDE HIS CONVICTION SO THAT HE WILL NOT HAVE A
CRIMINAL RECORD STARING HIM IN THE FACE. 49
On the final day of the hearings, Judge Phillips appeared. He had
been the chairman of the committee of the Judicial Conference of
the Senior Circuit Judges, which had given particular attention to
the study of treatment of youth offenders convicted in the federal
courts. What he said is pivotal, because the McMains court wrote
that he expressed a view "contrary" to that of the other judges, and
it was on that basis that Judges Ross and Stephenson concluded the
legislative history underlying the FYCA was "inconclusive." ' ,, Since
Judge Phillips' statement is the only testimony ever referred to in
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Hearings, supra note 41, at 14.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 45.
Id.
540 F.2d at 389.
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support of a finding that section 5021 is not an expungement law,
the entire line of testimony must be reproduced in order to put the
record in proper context and not mislead regarding what was understood so clearly about the section.
Judge Phillips. WELL, OF COURSE THE ACT DOES PROVIDE FOR THE WIPING OUT OF THE CONVICTION IF THE
YOUTH IS DISCHARGED, REHABILITATED AND BEHAVES
HIMSELF AFTER HIS PERIOD OF SUPERVISION. THE PURPOSE OF THAT IS TO HELP HIM GET A JOB AND KEEP
HIM FROM HAVING TO BE TURNED DOWN BY A PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT HE
HAS HAD A CONVICTION. IT DOES NOT ENTIRELY REMOVE THE DIFFICULTY BUT HE CAN SAY TO THE PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER, "I HAVE GONE THROUGH THIS
THING. THEY THINK I AM REHABILITATED AND THEY
HAVE GIVEN ME THIS CLEARANCE AND I THINK I AM
REHABILITATED AND CAN MAKE GOOD."
It will be a great aid in restoring him to a normal situation in
society so that he can go out and get work. There is nothing more
important when a man gets out than that he get a good useful job.
Senator Kilgore. That is one thing that we do not look at. In the
Army, for instance, in West Virginia we had a young man who had
a magnificant [sic] record as a pilot of multiple-engine planes. At
least three air lines would like to have him as a pilot but for a
purely technical violation of regulations he got a dishonorable discharge. Until that can be wiped out they cannot hire him. He
would have to have an honorable discharge, not even a blue discharge would suffice. That situation is simply eliminating that
young man from a job for which he is especially well fitted. He flew
the Hump more than any pilot they had.
Mr. Bennett. As was pointed out the other day, it is the same
provision as that which the Army has for restoration of a man to
duty."
It should be noted that after the judge's statement, the senator's
immediate response is to discuss the necessity of having a clear
record, and then Mr. Bennett, the Director of Prisons, United States
Department of Justice, referred back to the senator's description
during the previous day of procedures in the armed services pursuant to which service personnel could return to life "with no stain
on their records." Considering this testimony, there can be little
doubt that Judge Phillips, Senator Kilgore, and Mr. Bennett regarded the proposed FYCA as a bill which mandated expunction of
51.

Hearings, supra note 41, at 70.
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a youth offender's criminal records.
Therefore, the testimony of Judges Laws, Parker, and Phillips is
not contradictory, and it is simply baffling to'read in the McMains
opinion that Judge Phillips expressed a view "contrary" to the other
two judges. Judge Laws said the records were to be cleared so there
would be no stigma; Judge Parker told the committee there would
be no remaining criminal record; Judge Phillips said the conviction
was wiped out. The common sense interpretation of "wipe out" is
corroborated by the technical definitions: to wipe out means to
"erase, obliterate,"5 2 or "to destroy completely. 5 3
Judge Phillips, however, also observed that a young person seeking a job might still have a problem. Did the McMains court believe
that this reference to a continuing problem signified that the judge
thought the record would not be wiped out, despite the language two
sentences before? Apparently so, although that would be a strained
interpretation. The McMains court never explained why it-decided
that Judge Phillips' testimony was contrary to that of Judges Laws
and Parker. Nonetheless, Judge Phillips' reference to the difficulty
a young person has after expunction of his criminal records surely
was concerned with the fact that people, especially those in small
or close-knit communities, remember convictions for years. In such
situations, the certificate setting aside the conviction can be shown,
but it is unrealistic to think that showing a certificate will completely overcome the effect of a criminal record on employment
opportunities; 5 however, in some cases it may be helpful as tangible
evidence of the government's faith in this youth's rehabilitation.
Reading the McMains opinion by itself, one would remain unapprised of further testimony at the hearings which showed that those
in attendance were convinced that a youth offender's criminal records were to be expunged. During the afternoon session on the last
day, James E. Palmer, president of the Federal Bar Association,
appeared to support the bill on behalf of that organization. He
stated:
I commend the part of the bill that wipes off the offense, so to
speak. To me that is very highly important in instilling in the
hearts and minds of these youths that we turn back some inspira-52.
53.

WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1631 (2d ed. 1976).

RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED EDITION 2623
(1966) ("Wipe . . . 2b: to completely expunge: obliterate, abolish, cancel . . . to cause to
cease to exist; ANNIHILATE - used with out.")
54. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a CriminalConviction,
23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970); Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L.Q. 306
(1970).
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tion to go ahead. Their crime has been wiped out and their Nation
still has confidence in them, and they will probably make good
citizens, all of them.55
John Holzworth, a former district attorney in Westchester
County, New York, also appeared on the last afternoon and described a system used by New York district attorneys to prevent
recidivism. He said the "biggest handicap a man can have against
him, no matter how small an offense is, is a conviction of and a
record of felony ... ."5 Thus, in New York offenders went through
the process "without even having the stigma of an indictment or a
conviction. ' 57 Then Mr. Holzworth said the New York system he
described was an excellent example of how the bill before the committee would operate.58 Referring to the offenders, he testified: "If
he [the apprehended person] did not come back and it worked out,
that was the end of it; there was nothing on record against him.15
b.

Other Jurisdictions

In addition, sponsors of the FYCA had precipitated the adoption
of similar legislation in five states, 0 including Massachusetts and
Texas. The Massachusetts law established a Youth Service
Board" and provided, inter alia, that the effect of a discharge when
ordered by the board restored the young person to all civl rights
and had the effect of setting aside the conviction.62 The Texas
Legislature established a State Youth Development Council 3 in
1950, and the provisions of its law regarding restoration of civil
rights and withholding records from public inspection are almost
identical to those of Massachusetts. 4 Even though the provisions
are not worded as expungement laws, the effect is the same because civil disabilities are removed and records are withheld from
scrutiny. Because the FYCA is modeled to some extent on these
statutes, they furnish an additional basis for ascertaining a legislative intent that section 5021 was designed as an expungement law.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(West
62.
63.
64.

Hearings, supra note 41, at 82.
Id.at 84.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 85.
Id.at 12 (testimony of Judge Laws).
Ch. 310, § 22, 1948 Mass. Acts (current version at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 120, § 1
1969 & Supp. 1979)).
Id. § 21.
Ch. 538, § 4, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 988 (repealed 1977).
Id. §§ 34-35.
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The 1961 Amendment

The most glaring omission in McMains is the absence of any
reference to remarks made in 1961 when section 5021 was amended
to add subsection (b) to include those committed to the youth division as well as those placed on probation. The amendment's sponsor, Senator Dodd, said:
I think section 5021 represents an important factor in the treatment of youthful offenders. It provides an additional incentive for
maintaining good behavior by holding out to the youth an opportunity to clear his record. . . .For those youths who demonstrate
a willingness to help themselves, every reasonable opportunity is
afforded to assist them in making a new start. 5
It is noteworthy that Senator Dodd's comments were never mentioned in McMains, despite the fact that the youth offender there
had received his certificate setting aside the conviction under
subsection (b).
The legislative history outlined above clearly demonstrates that
Congress intended section 5021 to be an expungement statute. The
sponsors said the records of young persons released early are wiped
out and youth offenders understand at the time of sentencing that
they are eligible for and should work towards obtaining the benefits
held out by the government in section 5021. Jettisoning this promise
of a chance to rid oneself of a lifetime, extra-judicial second sentence is unwarranted.
2.

The McMains Analysis

After determining that the legislative history was inconclusive,
the McMains court interpreted section 5021 by what it referred to
as its "own reading." The court addressed the following questions:
a. Did Congress manifest its intent clearly enough in section
5021 to authorize expunction?
McMains' first contention was that the language of section 5021
does not specifically provide for record expunction. The court was
"confident that had Congress intended to authorize expunction, it
would have manifested that intent with greater clarity. It has done
so on other occasions. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(2)."11 There are a
65. 107 CONG. REc. 8709 (1961). The McMains court also failed to mention that the
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, had stated previously in Brager v. United States, 527 F.2d
895, 897 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975), that "a youth offender may be able to have his conviction
expunged from his record."
66. 540 F.2d at 389.

410

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:395

number of responses to the court's position. The question is what
would the average person mean by the words "set aside the conviction." The ordinary meaning of "set aside" is to dismiss from the
mind, to discard, vacate, annul, quash, make void. 7 When one adds
to this definition the overwhelming evidence at the hearings that the
youth's records were intended to be "wiped out," the purpose of
section 5021 is clear.
Congress intended expunction. With respect, the McMains conclusion is, to say the least, not a little remarkable. The salient
thought expressed at the hearings and by Senator Dodd gt the time
of amending section 5021 is clear and unequivocal; it was an overwhelming penchant for expunction. Yet, an interpretation for expunction is rejected because Congress was more explicit in drafting
a drug law twenty years after passage of the FYCA. In 1949, the
federal judges who drafted the FYCA had no model acts to follow,
and they were unaware of the intricate procedures used by agencies
to wipe out records from the vast data collection systems kept by
state and federal police. This became apparent only after the Vietnam demonstrations and the large number of drug convictions in
the late 1960's.1
Additionally, the fact that Congress used a different approach in
1970 means little regarding its intentions in 1950. Even more important, under 21 U.S.C. § 844, which the McMains court cited as
showing a clearer intent to expunge, an offender of any age convicted of a first offense for possession of a controlled substance can
be placed on probation without being sentenced. After the probation
period all proceedings are dismissed without a court adjudication of
guilt and the individual is not considered to have been convicted for
any purpose." By providing that no public record would be kept of
a first offense, Congress intended to erase completely the stigma of
a conviction and its collateral burden. 0 The incongruous result is
that an adult sentenced under the drug law can be the recipient of
more favorable treatment than a young person sentenced and receiving treatment under the FYCA for the same crime. This violates
one of the earliest rules regarding interpretation of statutes, that the
judge should always make such construction as shall advance the
67.

See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LAW DICIONARY 1191 (3d ed. 1969);

INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW

2077 (1976).

68. See Kutcher, Looking at the Law, 42 (no. 3) FED. PROBATION 60, 61 (1978).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(1) (1976).
70. If the first offender is under 21, 21 U.S.C. § 844(b)(2) provides that all records be
expunged except a nonpublic one to be maintained by the Department of Justice for use in
determining future eligibility under § 844(b)(2).
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true intent of the legislators. 7 ' Congress never intended such an
inconsistency. It denies fundamental fairness to require a youth
offender to undergo a comprehensive scheme of treatment and then
be in a worse position than an adult drug offender whose records
were cleared. Thus, the first reason offered by Judges Ross and
Stephenson does not support their decision.
b. If the records were wiped out, what purpose would be served
by a certificate showing that fact?
The McMains court next states that section 5021's provision for
the issuance of a certificate to the offender upon the setting aside
of the conviction militated against a construction favoring expunction. The court reasoned that a certificate would be unnecessary if
there were complete expunction of the records. This completely disregards the practicalities. Expunction would neither reach newspaper reports nor alleviate the situation in small communities where
a conviction often is common knowledge.72 This is precisely what
Judge Phillips discussed at the hearings. He said positively that the
conviction was wiped out, but that the young person might yet have
a problem if the employer knew of the conviction. It is in this type
of situation that the certificate is useful to prove there has been a
clearance. Judge Phillips' testimony before Congress directly refutes
the statement in McMains that a certificate would be unnecessary
if there were expunction of the records.
In addition, the certificate is tangible evidence to the young person not only that the conviction has been set aside, but also that
the government has confidence in his/her future. This point was
made to Congress by the president of the Federal Bar Association .73
Finally, delivery of the certificate can serve as a triggering device
to an official agency informing it to wipe out the records.
c. Was it incongruousfor Congress to provide for expunging conviction, but not arrest, records?
For its final reason that section 5021 is not an expungement law,
the McMains court stated it would be incongruous to infer a statutory right to expunge a conviction when there is no similar right in
most cases for expunging an arrest record that does not result in
prosecution. This ignores the fact that the subject of the FYCA was
rehabilitation of those convicted of federal crimes, not rehabilitation of persons arrested for federal crimes. Concluding that expunc71.

Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584). See also 44 ENG. & EMPIRE

DIG. STATUTES §

149 (1965).

72. See Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 543 P.2d 988 (Kan. 1975), for an example
of a newspaper dredging up old news.
73. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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tion was essential for those who have successfully completed a treatment program under the FYCA while finding identical relief unnecessary for those merely arrested is well within the familiar rule that
Congress does not have to deal with all situations at once; it may
apply a remedy to one problem while postponing or even neglecting
others. In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated that congressional judgment is final so long as the problem is immediate and the
74
solution rational.
d. When enacting the FYCA in 1950, did Congress balance the
usefulness of permanent FBI records against the rehabilitativeimportance of a second chance for youth offenders?
After discussing the three questions above, the McMains court
summarily attributed the final form of the FYCA to an attempt by
Congress to balance the goal of rehabilitating youth offenders
against the societal interests served by criminal recordkeeping.7 5
Nothing from the FYCA hearings supports this and no corroboration
is offered in the court's opinion.
In Dorszynski v. United States, Chief Justice Burger said the
FYCA was "designed to provide a better method for treating young
offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket,
[16 to 22] to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns." 6 The Dorszynski opinion does not say precisely how this is
to be accomplished, but congressional intent is clear about the goal
of relieving youths of tainted records. That purpose was not weighed
by Congress against the worth of criminal records; to the contrary,
it was implicit that the records were to be set aside and wiped out,
not stored and distributed.77
e. Apart from the FYCA, do United States District Courts have
inherent power to order expunction?
The McMains court, having determined that section 5021 does
74. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489, rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 925
(1955). In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966), the Court stated "that a 'statute
is not invalid. . . because it might have gone further than it did,'. . . that a legislature need
not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' . . . and that 'reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind
.... ' Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
75. 540 F.2d at 389.
76. 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974).
77. Enormous sums are spent collecting, storing, retrieving, and disseminating information from dossiers throughout the United States; the claim that such dossiers serve a critical
role in the control of crime has gone virtually unchallenged. A congressional study of the costs
and benefits probably would be worthwhile to evaluate the damage to human lives against
the danger to the public of having fewer criminal files. See generally A. NEIER, supra note
11; A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 11; The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction,
supra note 54. Statements supporting maintenance of criminal records for law enforcement
purposes usually are unsupported by data. E.g., Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination
of CriminalRecords: A Legislative Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 654, 668 n.87 (1972).
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not permit expunction, considered next whether the sentencing
judge had the inherent power to wipe out the records. In cursory
fashion, the court said no-such authority existed because the power
of expungement is a narrow one not routinely used, and because
Duane Thomas McMains had shown no extraordinary circumstances warranting clearance of his records. 8 There was no discussion
concerning whether expunction of a youth offender's records furthers the goals Congress wanted to achieve by enactment of the
FYCA. The district court judge, on the other hand, had perceived,
quite correctly, that this was the proper question, as did Circuit
Judge Heaney in the McMains dissent. In a brief opinion, Judge
Heaney wrote:
I respectfully dissent. The admitted doubt as to congressional
intent should be resolved in favor of giving district court judges the
discretion to expunge the record of youthful offenders. These
judges are in the best position to determine whether the broad
purposes of the Act will be best served by expunging the record or
leaving it as is. I find no abuse of discretion here and would affirm
the district court.79
Heaney's view regarding the inherent power of a federal district
judge is sound. The authority of federal courts to advance congressional policies was recognized in United States v. Glasgow when the
court said "[iln order to effectuate the purposes of the Youth
Corrections Act, the court, under its inherent powers as an Article
III court having equitable jurisdiction may, in the appropriate situation, order the expungement and sealing of the offender's records.",",
This is in conformity with a cardinal FYCA principle of making
"available for the discretionary use of federal district judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of youth offenders."'"
The history of the FYCA shows clearly that its overall concept
(like the English Borstal System upon which it was patterned) is to
get young persons through the turbulent years, from fourteen to
78. 540 F.2d at 390.
79. Id.
80. 389 F. Supp. at 224 n.17. In United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
Judge Motley refused to order expunction on the basis of the presentence report, probation
reports, and facts of the case, but she recognized that "a district court has the inherent power
to expunge a criminal record if, in the particular case, expunction would further the purposes
of the Youth Corrections Act." Id. at 1013.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts believes "there is great merit to the
position articulated by Judge Constance Baker Motley in United States v. Hall, that a district
judge has inherent power to order expunction or sealing in an appropriate case, to further
the purposes of the FYCA." Kutcher, supra note 68, at 62. (Mr. Kutcher is Assistant General
Counsel to the Administrative Office).
81. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1950).
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twenty-one, and to ensure that they become good citizens. Read as

a whole and in relation to the ends in view, the FYCA demonstrates
that this was to be accomplished by treatment,"2 rather than by
retribution." As envisioned by the act's sponsors, part of this treat-

ment was to be an opportunity for a youngster to earn a clean
84

record.

At the time the act was passed, Congress had decided that the
earlier methods for treating criminally inclined youths were inadequate to avoid recidivism.8 Moreover, it was aware of the direct
correlation between employment and the tendency to relapse into
crime and antisocial behavior patterns.8 As the 1975 Vera Institute
of Justice report states, "employment is not only necessary for rehabilitation, but the process of employment itself with its discipline
and associated learning process is an important part of the rehabilitative process."87 Unquestionably, record clearing was made an integral component of the FYCA in order to assist youth offenders in the
marketplace and to give them a strong incentive to seek early release by responding to treatment or by complying with the conditions of their probation.
By denying federal judges the authority of expunction, McMains,
rather than advancing the beneficient goals of the FYCA, is indicative of a current philosophy which advocates punishing every offender in a legislatively prescribed way. The object of this philosophy is to take away from criminal justice personnel the freedom to
exercise their considered judgment in the imposition of alternative
punishments. The wisdom, compassion, expertise, and judiciousness of judges is to be eliminated for bureaucratic uniformity., The
trouble with this view is that while experts have differing theories
about society at large, judges do not sentence society at large; they
82. The term "treatment" appears throughout the congressional hearings and the FYCA.
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 41, at 19, 43, 61, 63; 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b)-(e), 5011, 5012,
5014, 5015(a), 5020, 5025(a)-(c). See also text accompanying note 65, supra.
83. H.R. REP. No. 2927, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1949). See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974); Brown v. Carlson,
431 F. Supp. 755, 764-65 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
84. United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. at 224.
85. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. at 433.
86. D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 311-61 (1964);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ING TO PROBATION §

4.3 (1970);

STANDARDS RELAT-

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-1005(d) (1978).
87. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROPOSED C.J.C.C.-V.E.R.A. SUPPORTIVE EMPLOYMENT
PROGRAM FOR Ex-ADDICTS AND Ex-OFFENDERS 11 (1975).
88. See generally Cressey, Crime, Science, and Bureaucratic Rule, 11 (no. 4) CENTER
MAZAGINE 40 (1978); see also Kaufman, The Sentencing View of Yet Another Judge, 66 GEO.

L.J. 1247 (1978).
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sentence individuals.8 9
When enacting section 5021, Congress intended to treat and sentence youth offenders individually and to give them a chance to
atone for their mistakes. Surely an FBI notation reading "conviction
set aside" at the end of a rap sheet is not what the sponsors of the
FYCA had in mind as a procedure which "blots out their sentence
and lets them go without any stigma on their life." 0 Such a notation
certainly could not be regarded as a treatment or as an aid in rehabilitation. The only fair conclusion is that Congress did not intend
the use of a system which brands youth offenders forever untrustworthy and compromises their job prospects.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that section 5021 is not an
expungement law, then to carry out congressional goals under the
FYCA, federal district judges must be able to exercise their discretion to order the expunction or sealing of criminal records on a case
by case basis. If (as the McMains court believes) they cannot be
entrusted to do this, we have reached a truly regrettable split among
the federal judges.
C.

The Aftermath of McMains, a Continuing Dilemma for Youth
Offenders Resulting from Confusion Among FederalJudges

Three courts have followed the views of the McMains court to
justify denial of record expunction for youth offenders." For example, in United States v. Doe, 2 the most important of the decisions,
the Sixth Circuit backed away from earlier statements it made in
United States v. Fryer that section 5021 "is by legislative design an
89. See Lincoln Star, Oct. 16, 1978, at 1, col. 1 (Statement by Warren K. Urbom, Chief
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska).
90. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
91. United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp.
1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Heller, 435 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (the court
followed McMains without making a reference to United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11 (6th
Cir. 1977)).
After this article was completed and substantially through the editorial process prior to
publication, Doe v. Webster, No. 77-2011, 48 U.S.L.W. 2103 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1979), was
decided. Stating that its holding and that of McMains possibly rested on differing interpretations of the word "expungement," the court ordered the FBI to expunge from its records
an Arizona drug conviction which had been set aside under the FYCA. According to Doe v.
Webster, the FBI must and the youth offender may respond in the negative "to any and all
questions concerning his former conviction." The opinion states, however, that the conviction
record may be placed in a separate storage facility so as to be available for use in criminal
investigations. The court refused to expunge the petitioner's arrest record, and this arrest
record plus the record of the Arizona court proceedings were left open. Although the holding
is contrary to McMains, the decision falls far short of the congressional intent that a youth
offender is entitled to a clean record in order to ensure a second chance without any stigma
on his or her life.
92. 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977).
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expungement statute. . . ...
1 In changing position, the court cited
McMains for the proposition that Congress could have, but did not,
explicitly provide for expungement in the FYCA. The Doe court
disagreed with McMains, however, regarding the inherent power of
a federal district judge to order expunction of the records in a proper
case

94

And, in United States v. Hall,5 a federal district court in New
York likewise followed McMains, which it cited for the theory that
the legislative history of section 5021 is ambiguous on the expungement question. Hall contains no evidence that the court independently analyzed the legislative history of section 5021. Rather, it
relied solely on the conclusions constructed by Judges Ross and
Stephenson in McMains.
If the courts continue to divide in their approaches to section
5021, federal law will not operate uniformly throughout the country
and youth offenders discharged in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
will continue to be denied the rehabilitative and humanitarian
benefits which Congress intended them to have. The muddled
state of the law leaves youth offenders and those who advise them
in a quandary because jury selectors, the federal Civil Service
Commission, educational institutions, licensing boards, and public
and private employers invariably ask young applicants whether
they have ever been convicted. This question may be followed by,
"If yes, were your civil rights restored by pardon or amnesty?"
These problems have been described elsewhere and need not be
recited here." It is sufficient to point out that the matter is so
confusing that on January 13, 1977, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts sent a memorandum to all United States Probation Officers stating:
The precise effect of a section 5021 setting aside certificate is
uncertain at this time. While there is strong support in the legislative history and in the case law for the proposition that a setting
aside certificate has the effect of expunging the offense from the
93. 545 F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1976).
94. 556 F.2d at 393.
95. 452 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96. See Schaefer, supra note 36, at 33-35. See also Kutcher, supra note 68, at 60-61;
Saperstein, supra note 36, at 6.
In the area of professional licensing, In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978) is an encouraging
decision which appears critical of the McMains philosophy. In reversing a denial of an application for admission to the bar by examination, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said:
[clourts differ as to the effect of setting aside of the conviction under § 5021. We
leave this decision to the federal courts. However, there seems to be no doubt the
intent and purpose of the Act is to encourage rehabilitation which will prevent such
a conviction from haunting the offender for life.
Id. at 979 (footnotes omitted).
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defendant's record, there is case law which states the contrary view
that section 5021 is not an expunction statute. Probationers, therefore, should be advised of both views so they can act accordingly,
particularly in situations in which they must answer questions
concerning their prior records, until a more clear and uniform policy is established by the courts.
Probation officers may wish to suggest that their probationers
seek a presidential pardon to supplement their section 5021 setting
aside certificate. This course of action is advantageous because the
effects of such a pardon are more clearly established under the case
law than a section 5021 certificate. Moreover, a survey conducted
by the Administrative Office several years ago indicated that few
states treated the section 5021 certificate as a restoration of the
offender's civil rights. Until the meaning of a section 5021 certificate is clearly established by the federal courts, therefore, probationers may be advised to seek a presidential pardon in addition
to their section 5021 setting aside certificate. 7
The suggestion may have merit, but it is not the solution. First,
youth offenders who have received certificates automatically setting
aside their convictions should not have to expend time, energy, and
money trying to obtain a pardon. Second, expunction is much more
helpful than a pardon from the standpoint of obtaining employment
and assuring rehabilitation. Third, it is clear that the FYCA was
intended to give the young people more relief than a pardon because
Congress expressly rejected the language in proposed section 5021
which read "and the certificate shall have the same legal effect as
a pardon." 8 Lastly, the burden should be on either the Supreme
Court or Congress to bring about national uniformity of interpretation and practice. To do that, one of the following recommendations
should be carried out.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation One. In accordance with its usual practice
when federal circuit courts of appeals are in direct conflict on an
important matter of federal law, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari at the earliest opportunity" in order to hold that a discharge under section 5021 expunges all records and lets youth offenders "go without any stigma on their life." It would be helpful if
the opinion expressly advised former youth offenders that they can
97. Letter and Memorandum from Carl H. Imlay, General Counsel, Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, to all United States Probation Officers at 7-8 (Jan. 13, 1977).
98. Hearings, supra note 41, at 7. It was Judge Phillips who suggested deleting the language. Id. at 71. See also Schaefer, supra note 36, at 32; Stanish, supra note 40, at 4, 6.
99. See R. STERN & E. GREssmAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.4 (5th ed. 1978).
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answer "no" when asked if they have been convicted of a felony.
Recommendation Two. Recent proposed amendments to the federal criminal code would repeal the FYCA even though no showing
has been made to support the wisdom of doing this.'00 In the absence
of such a showing, the FYCA, which was reflected upon for so long
by so many prestigious individuals and groups in the 1940's, should
not be lightly discarded.' °' Nevertheless, because the state has a
legitimate right of access to records in case of a subsequent offense,
many believe that a more desirable balance between society's interests in wiping out the records for rehabilitative purposes and its
interest in disclosure would be better served if youth offender files
were automatically sealed upon discharge rather than expunged. A
sealing proposal entitled "Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. §
5021" appears in the appendix to this article. The times when the
records could be unsealed are listed in paragraph (b); the principle
02
utilization would occur in the event of a later offense.1
Recommendation Three. An individual's legitimate right to treatment, rehabilitation and privacy, and the public interest in disclosure could be balanced by providing that after a person has been
free from the jurisdiction or supervision of any criminal justice
agency for two years in the case of a misdemeanor or five years in
case of a felony, his/her records would be removed to a separate file
and not released to anyone unless relevant for law enforcement purposes, for a determination of an issue involving rights and liabilities
of someone other than the arrestee or offender, or for determining
sentence on a subsequent violation. The records could also be
opened if the data were useful to counsel for the offender, to a court,
to a government prosecutor, to qualified persons for research related
to the administration of criminal justice, or to the head of a treatment facility or agency to which an arrestee or offender has been
committed. 103
Recommendation Four.If expunction or sealing of records is politically infeasible because of opposition, especially from the press"'4
100. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
101. Supporters of the FYCA included numerous federal judges, the Attorney General of
the United States, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Bar Association, American Law Institute, American Prison Association, The National Probation and
Parole Association, American Legion, Department of the District of Columbia, The National
Grange, Federal Bar Association, and The American Federation of Labor.
102. The fact that there would be no record of the offense under the FYCA for use "in
case of future offenses" was pointed out to Congress when it was considering the proposed
bill in 1949. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
103. See generally Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records: A
Legislative Proposal, supra note 77, at 677 ("Model Criminal Records Disclosure Act").
104. See Weinstein, Confidentiality of CriminalRecords - Privacy v. the Public Interest,
22 VILL. L. REv. 1205, 1212-13 (1977); Comment, The Press and Criminal Law Privacy, 20
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and law enforcement organizations, the approach of the Uniform
Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act is a
commendable alternative. Under this act, criminal records stay
open but it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate
against a person because of his conviction unless the underlying
offense directly relates to the duties and responsibilities of the particular occupation, profession, or educational endeavor involved."'5
In making the determination of causal relationship, consideration
may be given to whether the work provides an opportunity for commission of similar offenses, the elapsed time since release, subsequent offenses, and whether there would be association with the
victim involved.
V.

CONCLUSION

After reflecting upon the matter for a number of years, it is my
opinion that "tracking" rehabilitated first offenders by means of
nationwide computer systems is unmerciful. At some point a person
who has fallen from grace on a single occasion should be given a
second chance, free from the gnawing nightmare of unrelenting,
inescapable pursuit. Expunction is the best way to achieve the goal;
sealing the records or making the use of such records an unfair
employment practice are fair alternatives.
Regardless of what else is accomplished, either Congress or the
Supreme Court should make clear that federal district judges have
inherent power to order the expunction or sealing of a youth ofST. Louis U.L.J. 509 (1976). Proposed regulations of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration would have denied funds for crime prevention in states which compiled criminal
history records alphabetically rather than chronologically. 40 Fed. Reg. 22,115 (1975). After
the press complained this would make the data irretrievable, the rules were changed. See
Goodale, Massachusetts Court Grapples With Criminal Suspects' Right of Privacy, NAT'L
L.J., June 18, 1979, at 31, col. 2.
Arthur Miller, author of THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: CoMpuTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS
(1971), has stated:
Vigorous and diligent reporters can effectively monitor the criminal justice system
without examining the records of those who have paid their debt to society, who
have met the stringent conditions of the statutes, and who deserve a second chance.
If we believe in rehabilitation . . . then we must tolerate some risks. We should
permit some people to reenter the mainstream of society by eliminating the social
and vocational ostracism associated with an ancient record that does not reflect
their present worth. How can you quarrel with the principle of sealing the record
of a youthful peccadillo which has never been repeated?
Saturday Review, July 21, 1979, at 23, col. 2.
105. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-1005 (1978). For a discussion of the act, see Perlman & Potuto,
The Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct: An Overview, 58 NEa. L. REv. 925 (1979). See
also, J. WILSON, THINKING ABouT CRIME 204-05 (1975) ("[Slociety ought to insure that one
can 'pay one's debt' without . . . frustration in being unable to find a job.").
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fender's records on a case by case basis. This would not only overturn McMains but would be in accord with the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Probation, which recommend. that
every jurisdiction have a method by which the collateral effects of
a criminal record can be avoided or mitigated following successful
completion of a term on probation.10
106. AMIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE - STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 4.3 (1970). See also S. 1308, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.
1309, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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APPENDIX

18 U.S.C. § 5021
Section 5021. Nullification of conviction and sealing of records.
(a) The division may unconditionally discharge a committed youth offender before the
expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him.
(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court may
thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from probation
prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court.
(c) An unconditional discharge of the youth offender pursuant to subparagraph (a) or (b)
or this section shall cancel and nullify the conviction. A certificate to that effect shall be
issued to the youth offender by the division or by the court giving his/her discharge and a
copy of such certificate shall be transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to
any other agency which the division or the court has reason to believe may have records
pertaining to the youth offender's offense. No youth offender whose conviction is nullified
under the provisions hereof shall be held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty
of perjury or otherwise giving a false statement, in response to any inquiry made of him/her
for any purpose, by reason of his/her failure to recite or acknowledge such arrest or indictment
or information, trial, finding of guilty, conviction, sentence, commitment, probation, discharge, or any other matter occurring at any stage of enforcement of the criminal laws against
him/her from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.
(d) Subsequent to the issuance of a certificate pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this
section, all records relating to the youth offender's offense shall be sealed by the agency or
agencies having custody or control thereof. The term "records" means any item, collection,
or grouping of information about such offense that is maintained by an agency, including,
but not limited to, any data identifiable to the youth offender compiled at any stage of the
process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from
supervision. Such data includes any identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the youth offender, and any information in connection with the arrest, detention, confinement, indictment, trial, finding of guilty, probation reports, presentence reports,
sentence sheets, conviction, sentence, commitment, correctional supervision, probation, discharge, recordings, reports, information obtained by informants or investigators, memoranda,
cards, books of entry, police blotters, fingerprint data, palm prints, hand printing, footprints,
measurements, handwriting exemplars, lineups, voice samples, comparative personal appearance, photographs, writings, and information of every kind, and all copies of the foregoing
without exception that would in any way reflect any fact relating to or growing out of the
youth offender's offense.
(e) Within 60 days after receipt of a copy of the certificate referred to in subparagraph
(c), the agency to which such copy was transmitted shall mail to the sentencing court a
written verification, signed by an authorized officer or employee, certifying that all records
relating to the youth offender's offense have been sealed or that it has no such records. In
the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it shall in addition verify that it promptly
notified all private and public agencies and persons to whom it transmitted records regarding
the youth offender's offense to deliver all such records to the Bureau and that it requested
no copies or records whatsoever be retained.
(f) Nullification of a conviction and the sealing of records pursuant to subparagraph (d)
shall not:
1. Require reinstatement to any office, employment, or position which was previously held and lost or forfeited as a result of the conviction.
2. Preclude proof of a plea of guilty whenever such plea is relevant to the determination of an issue involving the rights and liabilities of someone other than the
offender.
3. Preclude proof of the conviction as evidence of the commission of a crime,
whenever the fact of its commission is admissible under applicable rules of evidence
for the purpose of impeaching the offender as a witness.
4. Preclude use of the conviction for the purpose of determining sentence on any
subsequent conviction of a crime of violence. The term "crime of violence" includes,
but is not limited to, murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, maiming, robbery,
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
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and assaults with deadly weapons, or an attempt to commit any of the aforementioned.
5. Preclude proof of the conviction as evidence of the commission of a crime in
the event an offender is charged with a subsequent offense and the penalty provided
by law is increased if the prior conviction is proved.
6. Preclude proof of the conviction to determine whether an offender is eligible to
have a subsequent conviction nullified and sealed -in accordance with this act.
7. Preclude an employee of an agency from disclosing records to the sentencing
court.
8. Preclude the sentencing court, in its discretion, from disclosing records to counsel for the youth offender, to the attorney for the government, or to qualified persons
for research related to the administration of criminal justice.
9. Preclude the court from releasing information to comply with a written inquiry
from another federal court, from a state court of general jurisdiction, or from the
director of a treatment agency or facility to which the offender has been committed
by the court. The court shall not release information in the sealed records to comply
with any other request, and responses to such inquiries shall be the same as responses made about persons who have never been the subject of a conviction.
(g) Any person who willfully disseminates, maintains, or uses information sealed pursuant to this section or who willfully maintains records in violation of this section, knowing
such dissemination, maintenance, or use to be in violation of this section, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and fined not more than $5,000; and may be removed from office or employment.
(h) Any officer or employee who signs a verification pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (e) which contains a statement of fact which s/he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, is false shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and imprisoned for
not more than one year or fined not more than $5,000.
(i) Any person who knowingly and willfully fails to seal any records which s/he knows
should be sealed under the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
fined not more than $5,000.
(j) The term "agency" specifically includes, but is not limited to, all courts, all establishments in the executive branch of the government, bureaus, boards, commissions, sections,
offices, divisions, departments, agencies, authorities, facilities, independent establishments
or corporations in which the United States has a proprietary interst, non-federal facilities
which contract for the custody, care, subsistence, education or training of youth offenders,
police, prosecutors, corrections personnel, other individuals and organizations concerned with
law enforcement, states, territories, and all subdivisions of such states and territories.
(k) The status of each youth offender or young adult offender unconditionally discharged
by the division or by a court between September 30, 1950, and the effective date of this act
shall be identical to that before the event occurred upon which s/he was convicted, the
proceedings in his/her case shall be deemed never to have occurred, and all records relating
to said event shall be completely expunged.
(1) All provisions of this section shall apply to young adult offenders whose sentences are
or have been imposed under the Federal Youth Corrections Act as provided in 18 U.S.C. §
4209.

